Understanding Hitler's Foreign Policy
Racial Vitality, Spatial Expansion, and Diplomatic Intricacies
Adolf Hitler, a man whose notorious impact on history is indelible, charted a foreign policy course that relected his deep-seated racist obsessions and territorial ambitions. Hitler only spoke German and, prior to his ascension, never traveled beyond the boundaries of his native Austria and Germany (or the WWI battlefields of France and Belgium). Despite his limited linguistic and geographical scope, Hitler's foreign policy ideas were crystal clear, articulated in his early speeches, writings, and infamous autobiography Mein Kampf. After his rise to power in 1933, Hitler swiftly translated these into reality, shaping the geopolitical panorama of the time.
Racial Vitality, Social Darwinism, and Spatial Expansion
At the core of Hitler's foreign policy was an unprecedented obsession with race and a distorted interpretation of social Darwinism. In his view, races competed for the land required to sustain their populations, with the stronger ones forcibly taking land and resources from the weaker. War, according to Hitler, was not only a necessary component of foreign policy but also a legitimate form of diplomacy, provided it served an adequate purpose and justified the casualties necessary for territorial acquisition.
Hitler's views on spatial expansion were deeply rooted in the history of German-speaking people, tracing back to the era of Charlemagne. Influenced by the territorial conquests of Frederick the Great, whom he revered as a "brilliant hero," Hitler rejected the thought of seeking space or resources in foreign colonies on other continents, advocating instead for expansion to the East. This theme permeated all facets of his writings and conversations from the earliest days of his political activism.
Then without consideration of traditions and prejudices, it [national policy] must find the courage to gather our people and their strengths for an advance along the road that will lead this people from its present restricted living space to new land and soil and hence also free it from the danger of vanishing from the earth or of serving others as a slave nation. [1]
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
Diplomacy as a Means to an End
Hitler viewed diplomacy and alliances as instrumental tools for achieving the goals of war and territorial expansion. His stance, as articulated in Mein Kampf, was unequivocal:
An alliance whose aim does not embrace a plan for war is senseless and worthless.[2]
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
His simplistic perspective on international political boundaries underscored his actions in pre-war diplomacy, where he often planned to break alliances and treaties even before the ink dried on them. In Hitler's mind, the end always justified the means.
Diplomacy in the 1930s: Navigating Ideologies
If we were diplomats in the 1930s, faced with the ideologies of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, what components of their worldview would concern us? How does one approach leaders who believe and express such extreme views? The challenge lies in understanding the mindset of contemporaries, perceiving events through their contextual lens.
Reflecting on the aftermath of World War I, diplomats might have pondered the effectiveness of the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler's unbridled hatred for the 1914 frontiers and his conviction that they were groundless emphasized the need for a reimagined post-war order. Boundaries were not the result of deliberate political action but momentary frontiers born of political struggle and chance. Aiming to merely reinstate the borders of Germany as they were before World War I was, in Hitler’s mind, an impractical goal.
The demand for restoration of the frontiers of 1914 is a political absurdity of such proportions and consequences as to make it seem a crime. [3]
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
By 1933, it was evident that Hitler was setting policy and making decisions in Germany. Diplomats of that era needed only to peruse Mein Kampf to grasp his worldview and goals. Hitler's rejection of even the pre-1914 borders and his emphasis on the German people's need for "living space" through force raised concerns. His views on alliances, particularly with England and Italy, hinted at a future conflict with France which he deemed "inevitable."
Japanese politics in the 1930s added another layer of complexity. The internal conflicts within various Army factions and Japan's imperialistic conquests in China, culminating in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, presented a perplexing scenario. Dealing with nations harboring such ideologies required a stance of force. Regrettably, the foreign policy of future Allied nations manifested as one of isolation and indifference in the United States and appeasement in Europe.
Lessons from the Past
The lessons from World War II reverberate in today's international landscape. Issues such as North Korea, the territorial aspirations China, and Vladimir Putin's actions in Ukraine find their roots in that period. Putin's rationale mirrors Hitler's methods of ethnic-based annexation and plebiscite, emphasizing the ongoing relevance of historical diplomatic intricacies.
Delving into Hitler's foreign policy unveils a complex tapestry of racial obsession, territorial ambition, and a calculated approach to diplomacy. Understanding the challenges faced by diplomats in the 1930s provides valuable insights into the choices and reactions of the time, serving as a cautionary tale for navigating contemporary geopolitical complexities.
The leaders and diplomats of our time would do well to study history and apply the lessons learned to today’s geopolitical landscape.
Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China. It is also a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. We will uphold the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, and advance peaceful national reunification. All of us, compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, must come together and move forward in unison. We must take resolute action to utterly defeat any attempt toward “Taiwan independence,” and work together to create a bright future for national rejuvenation. No one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Xi Jinping, Dictator of the People’s Republic of China in speech marking the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party.
Therefore, modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era. We know and remember well that it was shaped – for a significant part – on the lands of historical Russia. To make sure of that, it is enough to look at the boundaries of the lands reunited with the Russian state in the 17th century and the territory of the Ukrainian SSR when it left the Soviet Union.
The Bolsheviks treated the Russian people as inexhaustible material for their social experiments. They dreamt of a world revolution that would wipe out national states. That is why they were so generous in drawing borders and bestowing territorial gifts. It is no longer important what exactly the idea of the Bolshevik leaders who were chopping the country into pieces was. We can disagree about minor details, background and logics behind certain decisions. One fact is crystal clear: Russia was robbed, indeed…
Of course, inside the USSR, borders between republics were never seen as state borders; they were nominal within a single country, which, while featuring all the attributes of a federation, was highly centralized – this, again, was secured by the CPSU's leading role. But in 1991, all those territories, and, which is more important, people, found themselves abroad overnight, taken away, this time indeed, from their historical motherland.
Vladimir Putin, Dictator of the Russian Federation in an article he wrote justifying his invasion of Ukraine.
References
[1] Hitler, Adolf, translated by Ralph Manheim, and Konrad Heiden. Mein Kampf. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971, p. 646.
[2] Ibid, p. 660.
[3] Ibid, p. 649.
Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler & World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001.